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The issues in traditional Western philosophy of religion 
revolve around theism and its counterview. At the heart of 
theism is a belief in God, a personal being and creator of 
but organically different from the universe. And this God is 
believed to be knowable through revelation, or reason, or 
both. A counterview of theism would be the position that 
denies that there is such a being as God, and that the 
universe came to be by means other than what is narrated 
by theism. In defense, theists had made a tradition trying 
to justify their belief in God over and against the doubts 
and denials of the counterview.  
Wittgensteinians, and maybe Wittgenstein himself, had 
wanted to dismiss the issues that had long concerned 
mainstream philosophy of religion. These issues are 
deemed underpinned by a fundamental mistake and pur-
suing them necessarily means demanding for proof far 
beyond the stage where it makes sense to ask for them 
(Phillips 1970, 124). In effect, if not in intention, God is 
treated as if it is a hypothesis that needs to be tested 
(Phillips 1970, 72). But if one takes a hard look at religion, 
God is other than what theology and philosophy had con-
ceived it to be. God is neither a knowable being nor a 
factual entity that can be referred to in propositions; rather, 
God forms the core of a world picture that underwrites 
religious practices (Wittgenstein 1972, 63; Wittgenstein 
1980, 50, 82; Phillips 1970, 2, 17-19, 71, 85, 86; Phillips 
1992, 136-138). So if Wittgensteinians would have their 
way, belief in God would be, to use Wittgenstein’s own 
term, a hinge proposition. It is by its very nature immune to 
doubt and beneath the propriety of justification. Thus, 
efforts to justify, or undermine, belief in God is superfluous, 
confused and self-undermining. Their argument we phrase 
thus: 
Hinge propositions are immune to doubt and beneath 
justification. Belief in God is a hinge proposition. There-
fore belief in God is immune to doubt and beneath justi-
fication. 
Hinge propositions are so basic to any discourse that no 
coherent doubt can be raised over them and no justifica-
tion at all can be called for. Wittgenstein had made some 
remarks about hinge propositions and taking cue from a 
secondary Wittgensteinian text (Glock 1996, 78-9) we sum 
up the remarks thus: 
[1] They are certain for all reasonable persons. 
[2] Misgivings about them are an aberration rather than 
an error. 
[3] They are inherited fiduciary artifacts accepted fortui-
tously rather than by virtue of their demonstrated truth. 
[4] Their sense is less clear than empirical propositions. 
[5] They transcend both doubt and justifiability. 
We may take these points together as the defining 
features of hinge propositions. A proposition having all 
these features is incontrovertibly and ineluctably a hinge 
proposition; but the “hingeness” of one lacking some of 
these features may not be ineluctable, and certainly not 
incontrovertible. 
The statement ‘I know I have two hands’ is a hinge 
proposition, a kind of proposition “affirmed without special 
testing; …which have a peculiar logical role in the system 
of our empirical propositions” (Wittgenstein 1969, § 136). 
Any misgivings about it, such as raising a query “But how 
do you (or I) know that you (or I) have two hands?” would 
therefore be misplaced. Says Wittgenstein:  
One says “I know” when one is ready to give compelling 
grounds. “I know” relates to a possibility of demonstrat-
ing the truth. Whether someone knows something can 
come to light, assuming that he is convinced of it. 
  
But if what he gives is of such a kind that the grounds he 
can give are no surer than his assertions, then he 
cannot say that he knows what he believes. (Wittgen-
stein 1969, § 243) 
One can say that he knows if and only if at some prior 
point in time he had not been aware of that fact which he 
had since then known. But, barring extraordinary circum-
stances such as a serious neurological problem, it is 
unimaginable that a normal person at some point in his 
self-conscious life would for one moment cease to be 
aware that he has two hands such that he needs to be 
reoriented to the fact that it was so. To him, his “having two 
hands is, in normal circumstances, as certain as anything 
that (he) could produce in evidence for it” (Wittgenstein 
1969, § 250). None, in other words, can be more funda-
mentally certain than the belief that one has two hands as 
to be capable of obtaining something else to lend 
credence to it. To him the cognizance of having two hands 
is not one of knowing but of having, in Wittgenstein’s 
words, an irreversible belief. Any propriety of justifying this 
belief is from the start redundant and unfeasible. No point 
in justifying the statement ‘I know I have two hands’ can 
ever be shown, and no room for doubt about it can ever be 
made.  
Going by Wittgenstein, the fact about a belief being 
“shared by every reasonable person” is a mark of the 
irreversibility of that belief (Wittgenstein 1969, § 252, § 
254). If a person in his right mind would not in any 
circumstance cast doubt on and demand justification for a 
belief, then it must be to him irreversible. And if every 
person in his right mind shares this sense of irreversibility 
of the said belief then it means that that irreversible belief 
is ineluctable and incontrovertible. Only a person with an 
unhinged mind would bother cast doubt on an irreversible 
belief such as his having two hands. Anyone with two 
hands who in all earnestness has misgivings about his 
having two hands and thinks of ways and means to try to 
reassure himself that he really has two hands would be 
deemed mentally aberrant. Wittgenstein would “take him to 
be a half-wit” (Wittgenstein 1969, § 257). The society at 
large would call him “demented,” “mentally disturbed,” or 
“insane” – unless he is a comedian, or is in the business of 
philosophizing (Wittgenstein 1969, § 467). 
Theists believe in a God whom none could be greater 
than, one who is God whether or not there exists any other 
being who would believe that God is God. This God ought 
to be aseitic. And if the aseitic God had caused to exist the 
universe that each and every person takes for granted, 
and if it would so absurd t think that the universe could 
have come into existence without God, then belief in God 
ought to be an ineluctable and incontrovertible hinge 
proposition. But it seems that theism is not one school of 
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thought that offers a model of God such that belief in God 
would have to be an ineluctable and incontrovertible hinge 
proposition – something attested to by the need to 
demonstrate the existence of God. 
Wittgensteinians may be right in insisting that belief in 
God ought to be a hinge proposition. But it seems they do 
so for the wrong reason. The Wittgensteinian God does 
not seem qualified to figure on that hinge proposition. Such 
a God is merely embedded in a world picture (frame of 
reference or form of life). God does not have a being of its 
own. It is not clear what this world picture might be but it is 
unlikely that this could be thought to have a being of its 
own akin to platonic essence. If humans who happen to 
conduct their lives according to the world picture with God 
embedded in it all perish or even just experience mass 
epiphany and switch world pictures, God will simply fade 
into oblivion for without the living there will be no form of 
life and without sentient beings there will be no world 
picture. The Wittgensteinian God is merely contingent on 
those who believe it. And it seems to show: belief in God, 
even the Wittgensteinian God, does not entirely fit 
Wittgenstein’s description of a hinge proposition. 
It is true that belief in God possesses hinge proposition 
features [3] and [4] mentioned above. But if this belief at 
issue were really a hinge proposition then it expresses 
would have been so ineluctable and incontrovertible that it 
cannot be helped but be shared by all reasonable persons. 
Yet it looks like it differs in some significant ways from 
other recognized hinge propositions. The belief that the 
universe exists is necessarily ineluctable and incontro-
vertible for all reasonable persons. No person of sound 
mind would entertain for a moment the thought that the 
universe might not exist – not that he refuses to do so but 
that it is simply a given state that he just cannot bring 
himself to do so without feeling silly or ironic or both. Thus 
the belief in the existence of the universe is ineluctably and 
incontrovertibly a hinge proposition. But the classic 
Christian belief in the existence of God is in fact something 
not shared by all serious and reasonable persons. Anyone 
clearly can have the option not to postulate the existence 
of God and still make a coherent discourse. Many a 
famous person held in high esteem for their rational 
achievements have taken that option.  
It is methodologically necessary for every person to 
postulate the existence of the universe to make any sane, 
coherent and rationally sustainable discourse; a person 
can never have the option to be exempted from having this 
postulate and still remain sane and make any coherent 
discourse. Any misgivings about the existence of the 
universe would undermine virtually every reasonable 
discourse, including the very discourse that makes even 
such misgivings coherently conceivable. To doubt the 
existence of the universe would lead to all sorts of odd 
consequences such as doubting one’s self’s very own 
existence for in fact one is an organic part of the universe. 
Sans any one’s self there cannot be any doubter. Sans a 
doubter there cannot be any state of doubt. In effect, to 
doubt the existence of the universe is to doubt whether 
there could be a state of doubt. A person who would doubt 
the existence of a state of doubt and would demand proof 
for it to assure him that indeed there is such a state is 
either a comedian or is insane. On the other hand, 
postulating God is, by all appearance, not a methodologi-
cal necessity. If the existence of God were to be placed in 
doubt, only the theistic discourse would be undermined. 
One can eschew belief in the God of the theists without 
forfeiting one’s wit. Indeed, one can deny the existence of 
God and make a discourse out of it without necessarily 
risking ludicrousness and incoherence. To say in earnest-
ness ‘This universe could not have been created by God 
because no such being could be proven to exist’ does not 
entail obvious incoherence and would not evoke odd 
notions or make impressions of weirdness as it would to 
say ‘It shall one day be proven that the universe does not 
exist’. 
A believer in God may have only fortuitously imbibed 
rather than deliberately chosen his belief in God, yet is it 
conceivable that he may deliberately forsake it. This would 
not likely be enough for him to lose his rational equilibrium; 
he still may remain equally capable of making reasonable 
judgments, if not more so. Not everyone thinks that belief 
in God is a prerequisite to sane discourse. While, other 
than being a philosophical joke, doubting the existence of 
the universe may be an index of an aberration, misgivings 
about belief in God are not at all deemed similarly. 
Unbelievers who deny belief in God dismiss the believers 
as “superstitious.” In turn, believers adjudge those who 
deny their beliefs as “erring” or even “fools.” Those who 
are skeptical are said to be “in the dark.” There is no 
mention of insanity or being a halfwit or a moron in the 
exchange of uncomplimentary labels for linguistic 
conventions that Wittgenstein holds almost sacred as not 
to be tampered with does not warrant labeling believers as 
such. 
Justification of hinge propositions is uncalled for be-
cause, to start with, it cannot be meaningfully doubted. 
Casting doubt on it will lead to incoherence and absurdity. 
The doubt will creep over to many beliefs that sane, 
serious and reasonable persons take to be certain. The 
same doubt will cast doubt on beliefs that form the basis 
upon which one doubts. One would end up with a doubting 
game that entails doubting one’s own doubt. This is a 
game that only lunatics play, perhaps along with comedi-
ans out to elicit a good laugh, or philosophers going out of 
their way to probe the limits of reason. So doubting 
religious belief, being supposedly a hinge proposition, is 
misplaced. Still this begs some questions, such as why 
religious language is not shared or cannot be easily 
shared by all reasonable persons as hinge propositions 
are supposed to be, or why doubting religious belief is not 
deemed an index of an aberration as doubting a hinge 
proposition is. These questions cast doubt on the 
Wittgensteinian position that belief in God, or at least the 
God presented by the theists, is really that immune to 
doubt as the belief that one has two hands or that the 
universe exist. One therefore cannot be easily faulted for 
not treating belief in God as an ineluctable and incontro-
vertible hinge proposition. Justifying belief in God is 
probably still a sensible thing to do for the believer. 
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